Beteiligte Spiegelung

Gibt es eine ursprünglich durch Bewegung bedingte Grundlage für eine Intersubjektivität, die nicht durch Gedanken und Sprache vermittelt wird, und mittels derer Ego und Alter eine sich ergänzende Dyade im unmittelbaren Sinne bilden, ohne daß einer der beiden seine komplementäre Autonomie verliert?

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BRÅTEN, Stein, 2006. Beteiligte Spiegelung. Alterzentrische Lernprozesse in der Kleinkindentwicklung und der Evolution. In: Ulrich WENZEL, Günter DUX, Bettina BRETZINGER und Klaus HOLZ (Hrsg.), Subjekte und Gesellschaft: zur Konstitution von Sozialität ; für Günter Dux. Studienausg., Nachdr. der Erstausg. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wiss. S. 139–169. ISBN 978-3-938808-23-8

Der Beitrag geht an Hand empirischer Befunde der Frage nach, wie Sozialität entsteht. Im Mittelpunkt der Erörterung steht die Mutter-Kind-Dyade. Der Autor wendet gegen die Theorie von Günter Dux ein, dass dieser die Subjekte biologisch und anthropologisch als Monaden konzipiere, die nur mittelbar durch Denken und Sprache Intersubjektivität konstituieren könnten. Dagegen kann im Rückgriff auf die Primaten- und Säuglingsforschung gezeigt werden, dass es eine primordiale Grundlage für eine dialogische Reziprozität im vorbegrifflichen und vorsprachlichen Sinne gibt. Dies ermögliche es dem Säugling schon frühzeitig, sich in einem virtuellen Alter zu spiegeln. Darin liege die biologische Grundlage der Konstitution eines sozialen Alter Ego. Die empirischen Befunde weisen auf eine angeborene vorsprachliche Interaktionsfähigkeit bei Säuglingen hin. Eine angeborene dyadische Konstitution des Geistes mit einem virtuellen Alter-Mechanismus scheint eine natürliche Grundlage für eine Interaktions- und Lernkompetenz zu bilden, wodurch effektives kulturelles Lernen in Gegenüberstellungen von Angesicht zu Angesicht bereits ab der Geburt möglich wird. (ICA2). page

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In his great work on the historical-genetic theory of culture, Günter Dux rejects the train of thought on self-referential autopoiesis in the systems theory of Luhmann, which has adopted and adapted the concept of Autonomy (Autopoiesis) according to Maturana. Dux also partly assumes this when he defines "the constructive autonomies peculiar to human beings" as an introduction to his processual definition of the term.

However, Stein Bråten had already demonstrated some fifteen years ago that the monadology associated with the concepts of autonomy and self-formation in biological and sociological systems theory prevented Maturana, and later Luhmann, from being able to ask the following question about the initial basis of dialogical reciprocity in the pre-linguistic meaning:

Is there a basis, originally conditioned by Movement, for an intersubjectivity that is not mediated by thought and language, and by means of which ego and alter form a complementary dyad in the immediate meaning, without either losing its complementary autonomy?

Thus, this is a primordial basis for dialogical reciprocity in the pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic meaning. The approach Bråten presented to answer this question, starting from a dynamic-dialogical system perspective, was too radical, and thus his critique could not shake the system-theoretical positions. Luhmann, who had acknowledged the relevance of his statement about "mutualistic" or "dialogical" constitution, however, was suspicious of the use of such "demanding terms". Indeed, Bråten's postulate assumed an innate dyadic constitution with a virtual Alter that leaves the place of the virtual Alter ("virtual other") to the actual Alter, allowing the dyad to reproduce itself in the same basic dyadic form. This could explain findings in recent infant research, which is also corroborated by a neurophysiological discovery. The postulate is that infants can be expected to mirror others and unfold in the course of complementary gestures and movements in a self-renewing dyad with adults and others. Neurophysiological findings have discovered a mirroring system in the human brain that presumably supports this type of mirroring.

Now Günter Dux has criticized Luhmann's systems theory with his emphasis on processual enculturation. But also with Dux Stein Bråten finds limitations that seem to exclude an intersubjective reciprocity in the immediate and pre-linguistic meaning beyond the boundaries of the body. He also refers to Maturana and defines autonomy as follows:

> »Der Organismus ist in seiner Eigenorganisation innerhalb der Körpergren­zen durch die systemische Relationierung der Elemente und Prozesse von der Außenorganisation des Universums dadurch unterschieden, daß, was immer geschieht, durch die Prozessualität der Innenorganisation bestimmt wird.«

("The organism, in its self-organization within the boundaries of the body, is distinguished from the external organization of the universe by the systemic relation of elements and processes in that whatever happens is determined by the processuality of the internal organization.")

Dux states that the evolution from prehuman anthropoids to Homo sapiens is an evolution from a genetically prefixed to a constructive autonomy, defined as follows: "The forms of organization in the relationship of system and the environment must first be created constructively in the medium of thought and language by the organism or the forming system itself." Here Bråten still finds a certain monadology reflected. If we start from the assumption that the boundary of the body cannot be crossed even procedurally, neither in the genetically prefixed nor in the constructive sense, then an intersubjective connection to other subjects is possible only through thought and language, that is, only in an indirect sense. Just as Leibniz had to resort to "mediation" by God in pre-established harmony to find an answer to the question of how monads can communicate "without windows," the corresponding modern answer lies in the suggestion of thought and language. As long as one holds that a monadic organism functions only within the confines of its own physical system, the possibility that the organism can put itself into the perspective or situation of another organism in a direct immediate way is ruled out. Today, however, we can refer to infant and brain research results which do not exclude transgression in a direct or movement-conditioned meaning, and which do not presuppose linguistic or higher-order thinking processes. Bråten will try to illustrate this with the following descriptions.