CajunBot

BERKELEY, Istvan SN. CajunBot: A Case Study in Embodied Cognition. In: Handbook of Cognitive Science. Elsevier, 2008. p. 79-98. doi

One of the difficulties with writing about so-called embodied cognition, is that the precise meaning and scope of the idea is a little unclear. For instance, Ziemke (2003) has identified several distinct conceptions of “Embodied Cognition.” The most important of these distinct conceptions of Embodiment can be summarized as follows:

1. Structural Coupling: A situation in which a structurally coupled relationship exists between the agent and the environment is required for a system to count as being embodied. [⇒ embodyViewpoint] 1. Historical Embodiment: A situation in which a history of Structural Coupling is required for a system to count as being embodied. 1. Physical Embodiment: A situation in which a system requires “physical instantiation” to count as being embodied. 1. “Organismoid” Embodiment: A situation in which a system requires an organism-like body to count as being embodied. 1. Organismic Embodiment: A situation in which only (biological) living bodies count as being embodied.

It should be clear that Structural Coupling is the least restrictive notion of Embodiment, whereas Organismic Embodiment is the most restrictive.