[…] In a commons, however, the community can agree on and enforce rules about who can be excluded. “Open access arrangements lead to many perverse results when used with any type of good,” Ostrom said in her concluding remarks. “Common property arrangements may, on the other hand, work very well in helping individuals to manage some common pool resource systems.”
[…]
Shackelford approaches these twin challenges of internet governance and cybersecurity as extensions of what Ostrom called “the commons dilemma.” Cyberspace shares many attributes of an unregulated global commons. For example, some aspects of property rights are not well-defined and it is difficult to exclude users from accessing the cyberspace resource. Some aspects of cyberspace are depletable but not in the conventional, physical sense. New networks and processing power can be added to expand the environment and how many users can access it. Unwanted email (or “spam”) can clog an email user’s inbox. Unsecured computers can even be taken over by malicious software and used to crash a bank or other business’s website.
“These abuses may lower or deplete public trust—that is, the willingness of users to go online—much like a renewable natural resource that can be overexploited,” as two scholars put it.36 “Trust in the ability of the network to deliver its benefits,” they argued, “is the ultimate common pool resource in cyberspace.”
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NORDMAN, Erik, 2021. The uncommon knowledge of Elinor Ostrom: essential lessons for collective action. . Washington, DC: Island Press. ISBN 978-1-64283-155-9.