__Quine's paradox__ is a paradox concerning truth values, stated by Willard Van Orman Quine. It is related to the liar paradox as a problem, and it purports to show that a sentence can be paradoxical even if it is not self-referring and does not use demonstratives or indexicality (i.e. it does not explicitly refer to itself) - wikipedia 
# Motivation
The liar paradox ("This sentence is false", or "The next sentence is true. The previous sentence is false") demonstrates essential difficulties in assigning a truth value even to simple sentences. Many philosophers attempting to explain the liar paradox, concluded that the problem was with the use of demonstrative word "this" or its replacements. Once we properly analyze this sort of self-reference, according to those philosophers, the paradox no longer arises- wikipedia
Quine's construction demonstrates that paradox of this kind arises independently of such direct self-reference, for, no lexeme of the sentence refers to the ''sentence,'' though Quine's sentence does contain a lexeme which refers to one of its ''parts''. Namely, "its" near the end of the sentence is a possessive pronoun whose antecedent is the very predicate in which it occurs. Thus, although Quine's sentence ''per se'' is not self-referring, it does contain a self-referring predicate.
# Application
In Gödel, Escher, Bach, author Douglas Hofstadter suggests that the Quine sentence in fact uses an Indirect self-reference. He then shows that indirect self-reference is crucial in many of the proofs of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.
Quine suggested an unnatural linguistic resolution to such logical antinomy, inspired by Bertrand Russell's type theory and Alfred Tarski's work. His system would attach levels to a line of problematic expressions such as ''falsehood'' and ''denote''. Entire sentences would stand higher in the hierarchy than their parts. The form Denoting<sub>0</sub> phrase' denotes<sub>0</sub> itself" – wrong- wikipedia
# See also