In contemporary second-order observation, as opposed to its earlier predecessors, it is understood that there is no final verdict, no overarching consensus, no ultimate end, and no single “grand perspective” that includes all others.
LUHMANN, Niklas, 1993. Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing. New Literary History. 1993. Vol. 24, no. 4, p. 763–782. DOI 10.2307/469391.
ANDERSEN, Niels Åkerstrøm, 2009. Second-order Observation. In: ANDERSEN, Niels Åkerstrøm, Power at Play. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. p. 12–18. ISBN 978-1-349-31005-0.
Observing in the second order means to observe observations as observations. That means that what we articulate about the ‘observations’ as objects of our study also applies to the articulation itself. Second-order observation is simultaneously first-order observation, and takes place, therefore, within the framework of a difference. Thus, it is not a privileged position of observation, poised above other observations. The conditions that apply to first-order observation apply to second-order observations as well. The theory of observation encompasses itself, so to speak. The difference through which second-order observation observes is the difference indication/difference. Therefore, an observation can be formalized as the unity of the difference (see Figure 1.2).
This means that second-order observations are highly reductionistic. Second-order observations are only able to see indications and differences, nothing else! Second-order observation is not a pursuit of the general staff of observations. Observations must be observed as such in their immediate scarcity and not as something else, and this is precisely what makes systems theory so capable of deactivating banalities.